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Major engineering accidents are often caused by seemingly minor failures propagating through 
complex systems.  One example of this is an accident involving a Bell 206 Rotorcraft where a fuel 
pump failure led to the severing of the tail boom.  Cataloguing and communicating the knowledge 
of potential failures and failure propagations is critical to prevent further accidents. The need for 
effective failure prevention tools is not specific to rotorcrafts, however.  Failure reporting systems 
have been adopted by various industries to aid and promote failure prevention.  The catalogued 
failures usually consist of narratives describing which part of a product failed, how it failed, and 
the circumstances behind the failure.  While this information is vital to learning from past mistakes; 
often, the narratives are designed simply to report the events, not to use the data for product 
improvements or new designs. Therefore, more effective systems for cataloguing and utilizing 
corporate memory of recorded failure events are needed.  This paper presents the design of a 
computational database to support the failure prevention tool, the function based failure 
propagation (FFP) method.  FFP promotes failure prevention by identifying failure propagation 
paths through a system as early as the conceptual phase of product design, where impacts of 
failure prevention are greatest.  It uses a database populated by historical failure information to 
present specific paths that potential failures might take as they propagate through a system. The 







Major engineering accidents are often caused by seemingly minor failures propagating through 
complex systems. Two examples of this type of failure propagation are present in the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accidents of the Bell 206 Rotorcraft.  Accidents MIA86LA133[1] and 
DEN88LA180[2] experienced initial failures of a battery generator and a fuel pump, both of which led to 
the severing of the tail boom leaving the rotorcraft unusable and causing devastating injuries to its 
occupants. Cataloguing and communicating the knowledge of potential failures and failure propagations is 
critical to prevent further accidents. The need for effective failure prevention tools is not specific to 
rotorcrafts, however. Failure reporting systems have been adopted by various industries to aid and promote 
failure prevention.  The catalogued failures usually consist of narratives describing which part of a product 
failed, how it failed, and the circumstances behind the failure.  While this information is vital to learning 
from past mistakes; often, the narratives are designed simply to report the events, not to use the data for 
product improvements or new designs.  
 
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) are used most often in design and manufacture to estimate the 
risk of product failure.  The Risk in Early Design (RED) method is a PRA that enables risk assessment in 
conceptual product design by leveraging historical failure data.  However, RED can only calculate risk 
based on single failures, not ones that propagate through a system, leaving the devastating effects of the 
above rotorcraft accidents unforeseen. Therefore, more effective systems for cataloguing and utilizing 
corporate memory of recorded failure events are needed. This paper presents the design of a computational 
database to support the failure prevention tool, the function based failure propagation (FFP) method. 
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2.1. The Risk in Early Design (RED) Method 
 
The risk in early design (RED) method is a PRA that collects failure data from historical events, and 
combines it with functional models to perform risk analysis as early as the conceptual phase of product 
design [3].  RED presents a listing of the likelihood and consequence of function-failure mode pairs plotted 
on a risk fever chart. Since the RED risks are automatically obtained from historical failure data, RED 
allows even novice engineers or those unfamiliar with the systems being analyzed to perform a detailed 
analysis on that system. RED can detect specific function-failure pairs during the conceptual design phase; 
however, each entry returned is regarded as a separate and singular case, not part of any other failure [4, 5].  
Thus, this method does not consider combinations of failures or their sequence. 
2.2. Event Tree Analysis 
 
 Event Tree Analysis is a PRA that uses forward logic to plot a path from an initial failure to its 
potential outcomes [6].  Starting with the initiating failure, termed an initiating event, paths called branches 
are created along other events that can occur after the initiating event, in approximately chronological 
order.  Each of these events is limited to an outcome of success or failure, creating a number of unique 
branches made up of the successes and failures of the entire chain of events [7]. Unlike RED, Event Tree 
Analysis details the many different paths that can lead to the failure of a system. However, it requires 
expert solicitation to determine the initiating events or effect of those events, which may be subjective or 
not available.  Finally, this analysis focuses on events occurring in a mature system, making it ill-suited for 
use during the conceptual product design. 
2.3. Fault Tree Analysis 
 
 Fault Tree Analysis uses backwards logic to plot a path from an ultimate failure to each of its potential 
causes [8, 9].  Beginning with the ultimate failure or fault, potential causes of the failure are found and 
plotted, using Boolean gates such as “And” or “Or.”  For each of these causes, more faults are identified, 
until the most basic causes of the top fault are found.  Using the tree structure and the probabilities of each 
fault occurring, the probability of each branch of faults leading to the top fault is calculated, as well as the 
total probability of the top fault occurring [10]. Fault Tree Analysis, like Event Tree Analysis, focuses on 
chains of faults propagating in a system. Also, each fault tree created is specifically tailored to its top fault, 
focusing in on a particular fragment of the system rather than the system as a whole [8]. While Fault Tree 
Analysis does model chains of faults as they spread through a system, it too requires experts to brainstorm 
the faults and works best on a mature system, and is thus not suited for use in the conceptual design phase. 
 
2.4. Function Failure Propagation 
 
Function Failure Propagation is a method that uses historical failure propagation data to calculate the 
likelihood of a chain of failures occurring [11].  Using the flows in a functional model as “common 
interfaces” between functions, propagation trees that show all the paths that failures can propagate to a 
function are created.  RED is used to identify the most likely functions to start chains of failures, and 
analysis determines the functions most important to the system.  Using these most likely failures and most 
important functions as the starting and ending points of the analysis, the likelihood of each chain is 
calculated by using the collected historical failure propagation data and the Boolean operators “And” and 
“Or.”  This returns a relative likelihood between zero and one.  FFP hocuses on chains of function failures 
and how they propagate through a system.  As it uses a functional model as its basis, it is well-suited for 
use in the early design.  It relies on collected historical data to determine the likelihoods of those chains, 
removing much of the subjectivity of the analysis.  However, it is extremely dependant on the data 
collected in it knowledge base, and returns poor or incorrect results if entries are not present in the 
knowledge base matrix.  Thus, to properly utilize this method, a well-populated knowledge base must exist. 
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3. FAILURE PROPAGATION CATALOGUING PROCEDURE AND BELL 206 ROTORCRAFT FAILURE 
CATALOGUING EXAMPLE 
 
In order to collect failure propagation data, reports or other records of failures must be analyzed.  Each 
accident or failure report must be applied to a functional model in order to plot the path, if any, of the 
failure as it propagates through the system.  Thus, for any data collection to take place, a functional model 
of at least the systems involved in the report must exist. 
 
The reports used in this study are National Transportation Safety Board accident reports for Bell 206 
helicopters.  From an initial analysis of the reports, the systems that would be necessary to model were the 
fuel and air systems, the turbo shaft engine, the main and tail rotors, the lubrication system, the electrical 
system, the passenger compartment, and the controls and sensors.  Once these systems are modeled and 
combined together to form a single system, data from the reports can be collected.  The functional model of 





Figure 1.  Bell 206 Helicopter Functional Model 
 
Each report is then analyzed individually to find all the recorded failures.  Each failure is recorded 
along with its failure mode and corresponding function or functions.  As an example, in NTSB report 
MIA86IA250[12], an engine flameout is mentioned, as is fuel contamination and a blocked fuel filter.  
From these mentioned events, two failures were recorded.  The engine flameout was due to lack of fuel, or 
“no flow,” as mentioned in the report, and was a failure of the function “convert mixture to chemical 
energy.”  The blocked filter was a failure of the “separate mixture” function and was caused by 
contamination of the mixture with particles of unexpected size.  The report also states that the helicopter 
crashed after the flameout, thus the main rotor, “export mechanical energy,” also failed, due to lack of 
power.  This example of collected data is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Partial Listing of Collected Failure Data 
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Report: FTW85LA295
Cause(s): Failure Mode: Corresponding Function:
Tail rotor failure Unknown Regulate Mechanical energy
Hard landing Rapid descent regulate Mechanical Energy
Tail boom severed Impact Fracture Secure Solid, transmit ME, guide ME, etc…..
Report: LAX89LA297
Cause(s): Failure Mode: Corresponding Function:
Loss of engine power Fuel contamination Convert Chemical Energy to Mechanical Energy
Report:
Cause(s): Failure Mode: Corresponding Function:
Blocked & Collapsed fuel nozzle screen Overstress & contamination Separate Mixture
Fuel filter cap bypass valve stuck open in bypass mode Galling regulate liquid
Bypass valve sensor light not working correctly (intermittent operation) Unknown Sense Status Signal
Loss of engine power Fuel starvation Convert Chemical Energy to Mechanical Energy
Report:
Cause(s): Failure Mode: Corresponding Function:
Engine flameout Fuel Starvation Convert Chemical Energy to Mechanical Energy






Once these failures have been collected, they can then be plotted on the functional model of the 
system.  These failures are placed on the functional model, and the path between them, from the first 
occurring failure to the final failure, is plotted.  Continuing the above example, the filter became blocked, 
then the engine flameout occurred, and finally the main rotor lost power.  Thus, failure propagates from 
“separate mixture” to “convert mixture to chemical energy” to “export mechanical energy” by way of other 
functions, as shown in Figure 2.  The failure of the “separate mixture” causes the liquid-solid mixture flow 
to be stopped, and this “no flow” continues to propagate through “convert mixture to chemical energy” and 
to “export mechanical energy,” stopping the chemical energy and mechanical energy flows.  Finally, the 
other mechanical energy flow to the tail rotor would also be stopped, causing these functions to fail as well, 





Figure 2.  MIA86IA250 Failure Propagation Path 
 
Once the propagation path has been found, the propagation data can then be tabulated.  For this path, 
there are fifteen propagations to record.  Each of these propagations increments its entry in the propagation 
knowledge base matrix, as shown in Figure 3.  This is then repeated for other reports, further populating the 
knowledge base. 
 
















































































































Mix Liquid & Gas 1
Convert Mixture to Chemical Energy 1
Conver Chem E. to Mech E. 1
Transfer Mech E. 3
Regulate Mech E. 2 1 1 1
Distribute Mech E 2





Figure 3.  Propagation Knowledge Base Matrix with Data from MIA86IA250 
 
 
Once the knowledge base has been populated, the data must be converted to likelihood values that can 
be used with the Boolean operators used in function-based failure propagation.  The integer values 
contained in the knowledge base are then converted to decimal numbers between zero and one using 
Equation (1), to allow use with Boolean operators.  In a M x M knowledge base matrix, li,j is the likelihood 
of the i,jTH pair, where I and j are the initiating and dependent functions, respectively.  ni,j is the number of 
times the i,jTH pair has occurred.  A sample calculation of the likelihood of “regulate mechanical energy” to 
“transfer mechanical energy” is shown in Equation 2.  The converted knowledge base for MIA86IA250 is 











































































































































Mix Liquid & Gas 0.33
Convert Mixture to Chemical Energy 0.33
Conver Chem E. to Mech E. 0.33
Transfer Mech E. 1.00
Regulate Mech E. 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33
Distribute Mech E 0.67
Guide Mech E 0.33
Export Mech E  
 





This paper presents the design of a computational database to support the failure prevention tool, the 
function based failure propagation (FFP) method. This database, combined with the FFP method, provides 
designers a method to anticipate how subsystem failures will affect the operation of the complex systems 
they are designing.  This big picture view is obtainable during the conceptual phase of design since the 
failure propagation information is catalogued by function.  Since the data is easily available so early in the 
design process it has the greatest chance of preventing devastating accidents such as the NTSB accidents of 
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